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Abstract
The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision designed a system of risk weights (the
so called “standardised approach”) to measure the riskiness of banks’ loan portfolios. Its
ability to adequately reflect risk is empirically investigated in this paper, through an analysis
of the economic capital allocations implied in corporate bond spreads. This is based on a
unique dataset of issuance spreads, ratings and other relevant bond variables (such as
maturity, face value, time of issuance and currency of denomination) including 7,232
eurobonds issued mostly by Canadian, European, Japanese and U.S. companies during 1991-
2003. Three main results emerge. First, the spread/rating relationship is strongly significant
with spreads increasing when ratings worsen. Second, the estimated spreads per rating class
indicate that the risk/rating relationship might be steeper than the one approved by the Basel
Committee. Finally the difference between the spread/rating relation of banks and non-
financial firms appears quite blurred and statistically questionable. Following this empirical
evidence, we underline some adjustments in the standardised approach risk-weights that
might be considered for the future versions of the Basel Accord.
JEL classification: G15, G21, G28.
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 1. Introduction
1
In June 2004, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision released its reform of the
capital adequacy framework originally introduced with the 1988 Accord. This reform is
based on three mutually reinforcing pillars: (i) minimum capital requirements, (ii)
supervisory review process, and (iii) market discipline
2. As far as the first pillar is
concerned, the new Accord is based on minimum capital requirements for credit, market and
operational risks. Credit risk capital requirements, in turn, would be set according to a
standardised approach or an internal ratings-based approach (IRB). In the standardised
approach
3 the 1988 risk weights based on some broad borrower categories (sovereign, banks
or non-financial corporations) are to be refined by reference to a rating provided by an
external credit assessment institution, such as a rating agency. Column 2 of Table 1 reports
the new risk weights for corporate loans (banks would be assigned a more favorable set of
weights).
The risk weights approved in 2004 are slightly different from those originally proposed
by the Basel Committee in 1999 (also reported in Table 1); those were criticized by Altman
and Saunders (2001) because of the broad degree of granularity (only three buckets for rated
corporate loans were envisaged). Using data on historical corporate bond defaults and losses
per rating class to simulate expected and unexpected losses, those Authors showed that the
three weights of 20% (AAA to AA-), 100% (A+ to B-) and 150% (below B-) were too broad
to reflect the relative risk of unexpected losses in each bucket. Based on their empirical
                                                          
1 This paper has been presented at a European Central Bank workshop with the Chairman and Secretaries of
the Working Group on Banking Developments: we are grateful to Andreas Ittner and to other seminar
participants for their useful comments. We also wish to thank Paolo Angelini, Dario Focarelli, Antonella
Foglia, Fabio Fornari, Fabio Panetta, Alberto Pozzolo, Carmelo Salleo, Corrado Baldinelli and other
participants to a Bank of Italy seminar for their helpful remarks. Finally, we are grateful to Mark Carey and
Reint Gropp for their precious comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
2 For an analysis of the relationship between capital requirements and market discipline, se Berger, Herring
and Szego (1995).
3 Under the IRB approach banks would be allowed to use their own estimates of a borrower’s probability of
default produced by an internal rating system, conditional on specific criteria and on validation by national
supervisors. The IRB approach also confers varying degrees of independence to banks in setting the parameters
determining risk weights: the ‘foundation’ approach entails less independence than the ‘advanced’ one. Under
both the standardised and the IRB approaches the original 8% minimum capital to risk-weighted assets is
maintained.8
findings, Altman and Saunders (2000) recommended a revised risk-weighting scheme that
included splitting the A+ to B- bucket into two separate buckets (A+ to BBB- and BB+ to ),
reflecting the distinction between investment and non-investment grade borrowers (see
column 3 of Table 1)
4.
Following this and other comments, the final weighting structure approved by the
Basel Committee in 2004 split the second bucket into three: A+ to A-, with a 50% risk
weight, BBB+ to BB-(100%), and below BB- (150%, see column 2 of Table 1).
In this paper, we further investigate the appropriateness of this choice. Rather than
historical loss rates per rating class, corporate bond spreads
5 are used to estimate the
risk/rating relationship. More precisely, eurobond issuance spreads are used to estimate the
implied economic capital allocations of different rating buckets. This empirical analysis is
based on two separate exercises. First, “typical” credit spreads per rating class are estimated
through a multivariate regression based on a sample of 7,232 eurobond issues completed by
major corporations from some 90 developed countries between 1991 and 2003. Second, the
estimated credit spreads are used to capture the amount of risk capital associated with
different rating grades. This is done by estimating the amount of capital that is consistent
with empirical spreads and a risk-adjusted loan pricing formula (like those used by most
internationally-active banks with a credit value-at-risk – i.e., CreditVaR – model in place).
The use of a wide sample of Eurobond issues has two main advantages. First, contrary
to historical losses, bond spreads are forward looking and reflect the actual risk associated to
different rating classes, as perceived by the investors. Second, while default and loss rates
provided by rating agencies mostly come from US dollar-denominated bonds issued by US
firms in their domestic capital market, eurobonds are denominated in different currencies
and internationally issued by companies from different countries. They therefore look as a
more adequate empirical background for evaluating a regulation aimed at banks competing
internationally on global markets.
                                                          
4 Note that Altman and Saunders themselves mention that their revised risk-buckets underestimate risk for
grades BB, B and below B-.
5 By “spread” we mean the difference between a corporate eurobond’s yield to maturity and that of a
Treasury security with similar maturity, denominated in the same currency.9
This study uses issuance spreads rather than secondary market ones: this, in turn, has
two advantages. First, yields on new issues reflect actual transaction prices rather than
brokers’ “indicative prices”, i.e., estimates derived from pricing matrices or dealers’ quotes
6.
As such, they provide a more accurate measure of the actual risk premium demanded by
investors. Second, primary market spreads represent a better measure of the actual cost of
debt faced by bond issuers.
Using data from an eleven-year period (1991-2001) that includes at least one full
economic and credit cycle allows us to get reliable estimates of the spread/rating relationship
that are not biased by any particular state of the economy.
Three main results emerge from our empirical analysis. First, the spread/rating relation
is strongly significant, with spreads increasing when ratings worsen. Second, the estimated
spreads per rating bucket indicate that the risk/rating relationship might be steeper than the
one proposed by the Basel Committee. Finally, while eurobonds issued by banks have a
better average rating than those issued by non-financial companies, the difference between
the spread/rating relation of banks and non-financial firms appears quite blurred and
statistically questionable. This indicates that the distinction between banks and non-financial
firms proposed in the Accord should be further investigated.
Following these empirical findings, three main areas of improvement emerge for the
standardised approach. First, the distinction between banks and non-financial companies
might be reconsidered, as far as the risk-weights already depend on ratings. Second, five
rating buckets could be considered rather than the four (as proposed by the Basel
Committee). Third, any future revision in the risk weights might be adjusted to reflect a
steeper relationship between risk and rating.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model and variables used in our
empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data sources and summarizes sample
characteristics. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 elaborates on the
                                                          
6 Secondary market prices can even be misleading if dealers quote strategically. Assume a dealer does not
want to buy a specific bond. She would quote a higher price which would in turn signal high demand and a
lower spread. For more on the problems related to secondary market prices and spreads, see Hancock and
Kwast (2001).10
implications of our results for the system of risk weights proposed in the New Basel Capital
Accord. Section 6 concludes.
2. Model and variables
The empirical analysis presented in this study is restricted to eurobond issues
7;
eurobonds were chosen for our empirical analysis mainly for three reasons. First, they are
issued in relatively large amounts in a highly competitive market open to different kinds of
investors (mostly institutional ones) from different countries. This enhances liquidity and
minimizes the risk of price anomalies.
Second, the eurobond market is relatively unregulated: issues are not subject to
queuing or other costly procedures, listing only occurs for a minority of the issued amount in
order to meet institutional investors’ needs, investors are not subject to withholding tax, and
bonds are mostly in bearer form. These factors significantly enhance the possibility to
compare different bonds’ spreads.
Finally, eurobonds are denominated in different currencies and issued by companies
from different countries. This makes them a more adequate database for evaluating the
effectiveness and fairness of the internationally-adopted Basel weights.
Recent empirical studies indicate that several characteristics of corporate bonds,
beyond rating categories, convey information about their pricing (Elton et al., 2000). These
include maturity, coupon, time from issuance, trading volumes and face value. Our empirical
                                                          
7 “Eurobonds are purchased from the issuer by syndicates of investment banks that are formed on a case-by-
case basis. The lead bank (the arranger) draws up the agreement and collects a management fee, which is
shared with other syndicate members. The members purchase the issue according to a formula agreed upon in
the syndication agreement. The participation fees are usually allocated in similar proportions. The lead bank
negotiates conditions with the borrower. It prepares a “term-sheet” or “information memorandum” about the
issue that is circulated to potential syndicate participants. It also prepares, with the customer, the necessary
bond issue documentation. Once the information regarding the issue is finalized, the distribution agreement is
drawn up” (Melnik and Nissim, 2003). See also Levich (2001) for further details and a general overview of the
eurobond market.11
analysis is largely consistent with these results, as it is based on cross-sectional regressions
where maturity, coupon and face value all appear as independent variables
8.
The dependent variable of our regressions, “spread”, is the “nearest-on-the-run” spread
(that is, the difference between the yield to maturity at issuance of each individual Eurobond
and the yield to maturity of the Treasury bond denominated in the same currency and with
the nearest maturity)
9.  The use of secondary market spreads is avoided because of the
relatively poor liquidity of the secondary market for some minor eurobond issues. Using
primary market spreads also permits the use of “fresher” ratings because new issues are rated
near the time of issuance.
Issuance spreads reflect the issuer’s credit risk and the market conditions. As such,
they are a function of eight main factors
10: (1) the bond’s default and recovery risk, (2) the
time to maturity of the issue, as this affects its default risk premium (Merton, 1974), (3) the
issue amount, as this in turn is believed to affect secondary market liquidity, (4) the expected
tax treatment to which investors will be subject, (5) the currency of denomination
11, (6) the
efficiency of the bond’s primary market, (7) the bond market conditions at the time of the
issue, and (8) the macroeconomic conditions of the country of the issuer.
The variables used to represent these eight factors are briefly outlined below.
(1) Default and Recovery Risk - Our empirical analysis is based on the use of Moody’s
and Standard and Poor’s issue ratings as proxies of the bonds’ default and recovery risk:
                                                          
8 Note that, since time from issuance equals zero for all corporate bonds in our sample, only trading
volumes are missing, since they are not available when issuance spreads are used.
9 Note that this spread is computed directly by our data provider (Dealogic Capital Data Bondware), and
this makes it impossible for us to explore alternative ways to compute the spreads (such as spreads based on the
Treasury’s constant-maturity series) and their effects for our empirical results.
10 Despite the cross-sectional nature of the empirical analysis, some temporal variation is present as many
companies issued eurobonds more than once over the sample period. Regressions with the inclusion of fixed
effects are also estimated.
11 The latter is a relevant factor because of the different credit standing and liquidity of Treasury securities.
The spread of a eurobond issue is computed as the difference between the bond yield to maturity and the
equivalent Treasury one. A U.S. dollar denominated eurobond issue could, other things being equal, have a
higher spread than an Italian lira denominated one simply because the Italian Treasury security has a lower
credit quality and liquidity than the U.S. one.12
ISSBUC_01…ISSBUC_5 Rating dummies. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if
the average Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) rating
12 falls into the corresponding
“rating bucket” (see Table 2 for rating scales) and zero otherwise
13. These dummy variables
should capture the difference in both issuers’ creditworthiness and bonds’ seniority and
security structures
14. The rating buckets are the same as defined in the Basel Committee’s
standardized approach, except that an extra bucket was defined for BBB-rated debt, to avoid
mixing investment-grade and junk exposures.
In addition to that, the following variables are used:
SUBO A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issue is subordinated, zero if it is
senior. The expected coefficient sign is positive, as subordinated issues have a lower
expected recovery rate in case of default than senior bonds and therefore require a higher
return. However, its statistical significance could be poor as subordination is already
reflected in the rating
15.
BANK A dummy variable that equals 1 if the issuer is a bank and zero otherwise.
This variable should control for differences between banks and non-financial firms that
motivated the use of two separate sets of weights in the Basel proposal. Such differences
                                                          
12 These are ratings assigned by one or both rating agencies to the single issue at the time of issuance. As
such, they reflect both the issuing company’s creditworthiness and the bond seniority and security structure.
13 When the ratings assigned by S&P and Moody’s differ, we proceed as follows: first, ratings are converted
into a numerical value based on the scale shown in Table 2; second, the average value of the S&P and Moody’s
value is computed, rounding to the lower (less risky) value; third, the rating bucket is chosen based on this
average value. An alternative based on the lower integer value has been tested and found to produce similar
results.
14 Since our analysis aims at assessing the appropriateness of the risk weights proposed by Basel
Committee, which are in turn based on ratings, the latter represent the measure of credit quality on which we
have to focus. However, ratings have been shown to present relevant limitations as leading indicators of credit
quality. Using equity and liability data for US firms, Delianedis and Geske (1999), construct alternative credit
risk measures and compare their forecasting performance to that of ratings. They find these accounting based
measures to increase well in advance of rating downgrades and conclude that ratings are slow in reacting to
new evidence. Comparing actual market values and ratings for a large number of dollar-denominated
international bonds, Perraudin and Taylor (1999) report highly persistent inconsistencies between ratings and
prices (a bond’s price is defined as inconsistent with its rating if it is above/below the price it would have if it
were valued using yields corresponding to a higher/lower rating category).  However, these empirical studies
are based on spread changes and tend to focus on the limitations of ratings as leading indicators of credit
quality. Since our attention is focused on the cross-sectional variability of issuance spreads, these limitations
should be much less relevant.
15 Rating agencies tend to rate subordinated issues one notch below senior debt if the latter is investment
grade and two notches below if it is speculative grade.13
might be due, e.g., to the presence of implicit government guarantees, such as the too-big-to
fail effect, that are not already incorporated into the issue rating.
AUT, BIS, BANK, CHE, COM, CON, ELE, ENG, FEB, FIN, GOV, HEA, HOT,
IND, INS, MAN, MED, OIL, OTI, RET, TEL, TRA, UTI
16 – Industry dummies equal to 1 if
the eurobond issuer’s main activity is in the corresponding industry, 0 if not. These variables
should capture investors’ expectations concerning specific industries evolving economic
conditions that are not already implicitly reflected in the average rating of those industries. A
positive coefficient would indicate that investors’ perception concerning the industry’s
prospects are worst than the ones implicit in the corresponding issues ratings, and viceversa.
(2) Maturity
MATU The time to maturity (in years) of the issue
17.
 (3) Secondary Market Liquidity
AMOUNT The natural log of the bond issue US dollar equivalent amount (face
value). A higher issue amount is generally believed to improve, ceteris paribus, secondary
market liquidity. A negative coefficient is therefore expected for this variable
18.
(4) Tax Treatment
The following two variables are used to proxy for the different expected tax treatment
of different eurobond issues:
COUPON The level of the annual coupon paid by the bond. The effect of this
variable on the bond spread depends on the relative tax rates on capital gains and interest
                                                          
16 These represent: Automobile, Building Societies, Banks, Chemicals, Computers, Constructions,
Electronics and Electrics, Food and beverages, Financial companies (excluding banks, insurers and building
societies) and holding companies, Government-controlled concerns, Health and pharmaceuticals, Hotels and
Leisure, Industrials, Insurance, Manufacturing, Media & Publishing, Oil and mines, Other Industries,
Engineering, Retail, Telecommunications, Transportation, Energy and Utilities. The Other Industries (OTI)
variable includes industries for which less than 20 observations were available.
17 To avoid biases due to a couple of very long-term issues in our sample, all maturity above 20 years were
truncated at that threshold.
18 Another variable that is generally believed to affect a bond’s market liquidity is its age. This measure
rests on the belief that newly issued bonds are more liquid than bonds that have been in the market for a longer
period of time (Elton et al, 2000). However, our sample bonds are all newly issued as the empirical analysis is
based on issuance spreads.14
income. In some countries these two rates are different; however, given the wide range of
nationalities of eurobond investors, the a priori effect of COUPON on the bond after tax
value is uncertain. In addition to that, as most eurobonds are in bearer form, avoiding tax is
relatively easy for investors. Nevertheless, since in most countries capital gains are paid at
the time of sale, bonds with lower coupons may be more valuable because some taxes are
postponed until the time of sale and because the investor decides when these taxes are paid
(tax timing option). A positive coefficient is therefore expected.
REG A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond is a registered one and zero if it is
in bearer form. A positive coefficient is expected as eurobond investors would find it easier
to avoid tax payments in the case of bearer bonds
19.
(5) Primary Market Efficiency
The following four variables are used to proxy for the different primary market
efficiency of different eurobond issues:
MANAGERS The number of financial institutions participating in the bond issuance
management group (book runners, lead manager, any co-lead manager, and co-managers). A
negative coefficient is expected as this would indicate that a larger syndicate is able to
achieve, ceteris paribus, a larger number of potential investors. This would in turn result in a
higher demand for the issuing bonds and in a lower spread
20.
PRIVATE A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bond issue is a private
placement and zero if it is public
21. Other things equal, private placements represent a less
efficient issuance process as a smaller number of potential investors is directly reached. A
negative coefficient is expected as investment banks are generally able to exploit a stronger
placing/selling power in a private placement than in a public issue.
                                                          
19 Only 22.98% of the sample eurobond issues (1,662 over 7,232) are registered (see Table 4).
20 Note that an increase in costs associated to a larger number of syndicate members would already be
captured by the FEES variable. Quite surprisingly, these two variables are not significantly correlated: their
Pearson correlation coefficient is indeed low (0.306) and statistically not significant. Moreover, MANAGERS
is not significantly correlated with AMOUNT: indeed, the correlation coefficient is negative (-0.114),
indicating that larger issues are not associated with a higher number of managers.
21 Only 120 of the 7,232 eurobonds in our sample were issued through a private placement (see Table 4).15
FEES The amount of gross fees charged by the bond issuance syndicate to the
issuer. These include underwriting fees, management fees and selling concession
22. No clear
theoretical  a priori conclusion can be reached on the expected sign of this variable. A
negative sign would indicate that issuers can translate the higher fees to the final investors
through a lower spread. A positive one would suggest that issuers who are less appealing for
the investors (resulting in a higher spread), also imply higher bookrunning costs, reflected
into higher fees.
FIXED A dummy variable that equals 1 if the eurobond issue is a fixed-priced one
and zero if it is an open-priced one. While in a fixed-priced issue the investment banks of the
underwriting group set the issuing price according to their estimates of the demand for the
bonds, in an open-priced one the final investors play a role in determining the actual price.
As the investment banks participating in the management group take a higher underwriting
risk with fixed-priced issues than with open-priced ones, a more efficient primary market is
achieved in this kind of issues. This should in turn results in a lower spread. A negative
coefficient is therefore expected.
(6) Currency
DEM, DFL, EURO, FFR, STG, USD, CAN, OTHERCUR – Currency dummies, with
OTHERCUR grouping all currencies individually accounting for less than 2% of the total
issues. Each dummy variable is equal to 1 if the issue is denominated in the corresponding
currency and zero otherwise. These variables should capture both the different credit
standing and liquidity of the national Treasury securities and eurobonds investors’ currency
preferences
23.
(7) Bond market conditions at time of issuance
                                                          
22 The selling concession is a fee paid by the issuer to the members of the selling group in the form of a
discount on the price of the bonds.
23 The OTHERCU dummy was dropped to avoid perfect collinearity16
QI-91, QII-91, QIII-91, QIV-91, QI-92, …, QIV-01 – Quarterly dummies. Each
dummy variable is equal to 1 if issue i has been completed during the corresponding quarter
and zero otherwise
24.
BBB_SP – Spread over the risk-free rate earned by dollar-denominated, BBB-rated
corporate bonds in the quarter when each eurobond in our sample was issued. This spread
captures the variations in bond market conditions when the bonds were issued, in a more
parsimonious way than quarterly dummies.
(8) Country
CAN, FRA, GER, JPN, NET, UK, USA, OTHERCOU
25 – Country dummies
26, with
OTHERCOU grouping all countries individually accounting for less than 3% of the total
issues. These should capture cross-country differences in macroeconomic conditions and
regulatory frameworks
27.
3. Data Sources and Sample Characteristics
Our data come from two main sources: Capital Data BondWare and Moody’s
Corporate Default
28. Capital Data reports information on the major debt and equity issues
worldwide. As far as eurobonds are concerned, it provides information on both issuers
(nationality, industry, etc.) and issues (Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s rating, currency,
closing date, years to maturity, spread at issuance, issue type, face value, coupon,
subordination, gross fees, number of managers, cross-default and other clauses).  Moody’s
Corporate Default Database is a complete history of Moody’s long-term rating assignments
for both U.S. and non-U.S. corporations and sovereigns.  Both ratings on individual bonds
                                                          
24 The QI-91 dummy variable has been dropped to avoid perfect collinearity
25 The OTHERCOU dummy variable has been dropped to avoid perfect collinearity.
26 Eurobond issues are often carried out by wholly owned subsidiaries located in fiscal havens such as the
Cayman Islands or the Bahamas. In such cases, the parent company’s country (as indicated by Capital Data
BondWare and/or Moody’s Corporate Default) was used.
27 National regulations (mainly: differences in bankruptcy laws, see e.g. Appendix G in Gupton et al., 1997)
might have an impact on Eurobond spreads through differences in expected recovery rates in the event of
default.
28 Moreover, risk-free rates on 10-year T-bonds, used to create the RF_10Y variable, are taken from
Datastream.17
and issuer ratings are included, as are some bond and obligor characteristics such as
borrower names, locations, ultimate parent companies, bond issuance dates, original
maturity dates, seniority, and coupon.
All bonds with special features (e.g. callable bonds, perpetual bonds, floating rate
bonds) that would affect their price have not been included in our empirical sample. Spreads
at issuance for all issues of fixed rate, non-convertible, non-perpetual and non-callable
eurobonds during the 1991-2003 period were collected. This amounts to 7,232 bonds (see
Tables 3 and 4). Bonds issued by companies of Less Developed Countries (LDC) or minor
countries (such as Chile, Bulgaria, Malta and Mexico) and issued by central banks,
supranational institutions, central or local governments were not considered.
This sample suffers from two potential selection biases. First, a relatively larger
number of issues has been completed during the second half of the sample period. This is
partly due to a general increase in the average number of eurobond issues, and partly the
consequence of the availability of Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s ratings. This potential
bias has been addressed by running separate analyses of the two sub-periods in our sample
(see section 4.2).
Second, as companies tend to issue eurobonds when the market is more receptive, the
number of issues is particularly low in the third and fourth quarter of 1998, when the Russian
crisis occurred, and particularly high during 1999, during a low interest rate environment.
However, this potential bias should have a limited impact on a sample period covering
thirteen years.
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ratings at issuance for these 7,232 issues are
either from Capital Data BondWare or from the January, 2001 release of Moody’s Corporate
Default Database. Both Moody’s and S&P ratings are available for 2,700 eurobond issues
which represent 37.3% of the entire sample issues. For the remaining 4,572 issues (62.7% of
the sample) only one of the two ratings is available. When both ratings are available, the
corresponding numerical value is the same in 65.3% of the cases (1,763 issues), is different18
by one notch only in 26.2% of the cases (708 issues) and by two notches in 6.2% of the cases
(167 issues)
29.
More information on sample characteristics is provided in Tables 5 and 6. As shown
by Table 5, most of the sample issues have been completed by US, German, UK, French and
Japanese companies. Together, they account for more than two thirds of the issues and
almost three quarters of the total amounts. The average spread is significantly higher than the
sample average for UK, Canadian and US issuers.
Table 6 reports the main features of the sample by rating category. Most of the issues
fall into the first six notches (from AAA to A in the S&P scale and from Aaa to A2 in the
Moody’s’ one). However, the remaining grades account for more than 1,800 bonds (that is,
more than 25% of the total sample), with more than 500 speculative-grade issues. Therefore,
we feel confident that the conclusions reached by our analyses still are reliable also for
below-A borrowers. Average spreads per rating category increase almost monotonically with
rating values, although classes below CCC+/Caa1, for which a limited number of issues is
available, do not show any clear pattern. Note that banks are mostly concentrated in the top
four rating classes (from AAA/Aaa to A+/A1).
Sample issues were also broken down by year of issuance, currency of denomination
and industry of the issuer (results not reported to save room). As concerns time,  the total
amount issued per year has grown from 43 billion USD in 1991 to more than USD 430
billion in 2003, with the average issue growing from just over 200 million USD to more than
500 million USD. The average spread has significantly fluctuated over time, reaching a peak
of 126 basis points in 2000, while the average rating has significantly worsened, from 2.7
(equivalent to AA+/AA in the S&P scale) in 1991 to 5.6 in 2003 (approximately equivalent
                                                          
29 A difference of more than two notches is present in only 62 of the 2,700 issues for which both ratings are
available (2.3% of the issues). We checked for these differences for the banks’ issuers subsample too, in order
to test whether a higher degree of uncertainty is present. Results appear similar to those of the entire sample.
Indeed, of the total 3,698 bank issues, both ratings were available for 1,562 only. When both ratings are
available, the corresponding numerical value is the same in 72.3% of the cases (1,129 issues), is different by
one notch in 21.7% of the cases (339 issues), and is different by two notches in just 4.8% of the cases (75
issues).19
to A).
30 As far as the currency of denomination is concerned, three currencies (Euro, British
pound sterling and U.S. dollar) account for 64% of the issues and 80% of the amounts.
Finally, the industry distribution of the sample issuers shows that more than half of the
issues have been completed by banks (51%), while only two other industries
(Telecommunications and Energy/Utilities) individually account for more than 5%.
Significant differences emerge among industries’ average spreads. These differences
basically reflect differences in the industries’ average ratings.
4. Empirical results
4.1  Regression analysis
Table 7 reports various estimates of our model coefficients and (White’s
heteroskedasticity-consistent) standard errors. Adjusted R2s are shown at the bottom of the
table, together with F-statistics.
Column (1) shows our basic regression: an adjusted R2 of 0.84 indicates that ratings
and other control variables explain a significant portion of the spreads’ cross-sectional
variability.
All rating dummies are statistically significant at the 1% level (the first bucket is
omitted to avoid perfect collinearity, and can be thought to have a zero coefficient); the
monotonic pattern of the coefficients indicates that spreads rise when ratings worsen. Not
only are the dummy coefficients different from zero: what is more, the values assigned to
adjacent rating buckets are always statistically different from each other at the 1% level, as
shown by a set of Wald tests
31.
                                                          
30 Note that such averages were computed based on the numeric scale reported in Table 2, where the
distance between two adjacent grades is supposed to be constant (that is, the difference between AAA and AA+
is supposed to be equivalent to that between a BBB- and BB+). This does not apply to our regression results,
where each rating class is represented by means of a separate dummy.
31 F-tests are: 281.6 (ISSBUC02 versus ISSBUC03), 227.6 (ISSBUC03 versus ISSBUC04), 142.8
(ISSBUC04 versus ISSBUC05).20
MATU and FEES both have significant coefficients with the expected signs
32. SUBO
also has a positive (although statistically weaker) effect, indicating that investors require a
higher risk premium on subordinated bonds than the one implicit in the agency ratings. Quite
surprisingly, AMOUNT is not statistically significant. This result is consistent with previous
empirical evidence
33 and could be attributed to two main factors: (i) the liquidity of the
eurobonds’ secondary market is not affected by the size of the issues, (ii) eurobond investors
tend to hold these securities to maturity and are therefore indifferent to their secondary
market liquidity.
COUPON and REG have a positive, significant coefficient as expected
34, indicating
that investors require a higher return on higher-coupon and/or registered issues due to their
relatively worst tax treatment
35. On the other hand, PRIVATE and FIXED do not appear
statistically meaningful,
The BANK dummy lacks statistical significance. This means that, while eurobonds
issued by banks do have a better average rating than those issued by non-financial
companies, no significant difference emerges in the spread/rating relationship between banks
and non-financial firms. This might have policy implications for the future work of the Basel
Committee (namely, for any update in the “standardized” approach, in which banks presently
                                                          
32 Fons (1994) shows that, although spreads increase with maturity for investment-grade bonds, the opposite
is true for speculative issues. Hence, we tried to use estimate the effect of the “maturity” variable separately for
junk bonds, by means of a multiplicative dummy. However, although a difference emerges between the two
slopes, none of them is negative. This could be explained by the fact that Fons’ regressions are univariate
models, where maturity fails to be significant for most rating classes and the R-square never reaches 10%; our
regressions, instead, use maturity as just one of the many drivers of bond spreads. In addition to that, our
models are based on primary market spreads as a dependent variable, while Fons draws on secondary market
data.
33 Analyzing yield differences between corporate bonds and medium-term notes (MTNs), Crabbe and
Turner (1995) find no relationship between size and yields of MTNs that have the same issuance date, the same
maturity and the same issuer. Furthermore, they find that bonds and MTNs have statistically equivalent yields.
This contrasts with the idea that large issues have larger liquidity and suggests that large and small securities
issued by the same borrower are close substitutes.
34 This empirical result is consistent with Elton et al. (2000).
35 Based on the suggestion of an anonymous Referee, we also tested an alternative specification of our
model including a set of multiplicative dummies representing the interaction between COUPON and the
country dummies; by doing so, the impact of the COUPON variable was estimated separately for each country.
Although most of the new dummies proved significant, they did not significantly affect the overall explanatory
power of the model and the coefficients associated with all other non-country variables remain basically
unchanged.21
enjoy a more favorable weighting scheme), and we shall return to this result in our final
remarks.
All reported currency dummies have significant positive coefficients, indicating that
those currencies command higher spreads than the remaining ones. This result flows from
the higher credit standing and liquidity of their Treasury issues
36, because spreads are
computed by subtracting such Treasury yields from eurobond yields.
Country dummies also look significant: their joint F-statistic (not reported in the
Table) is 22.68, with a p-value of less than 1%. This could be explained by national
macroeconomic conditions, as well as by national bankruptcy codes affecting investors’
expectations on recovery rates in the event of default.
                                                          
36 French or German governments Treasuries are used to compute Euro denominated bond spreads,
according to which of the two closest government bonds has the closer maturity to the one of the eurobond
issue.22
Finally, the joint F-statistic for quarterly dummies
37 (63.8) is highly significant,
suggesting that market conditions do affect Eurobond spreads. However, while quarter
dummies help us achieve a better fit of the past behavior of the eurobond market, they
become useless for simulation purposes. In other words, when one wants to use the model in
Table 7 to infer what spreads the market would expect from differently-rated bonds, it is
impossible to specify a value for the dummies associated with future quarters.
To address this issue, we scrutinized our set of quarterly dummies more carefully, and
found out that they were strongly correlated (63.8%) with the average level of BBB-rated,
US dollar-denominated corporate bond spreads
38. We therefore substituted all quarterly
dummies with just one variable, BBB_SP, expressing the value of the corporate bond spread
in the week when each eurobond issue in our sample was completed. This makes our model
(see column 2 in Table 7) much more parsimonious and transparent (it can now be used also
to run simulations, provided that a value the average BBB-spread is specified), while
reducing the adjusted R-square only slightly. BBB_SP has a positive coefficient, implying
that each individual issue in our sample is directly affected by the overall “market mood”
embedded in the BBB corporate bond spread.
The results for this alternative specification (Table 7, column 2) are very similar to our
base model (note that the SUBO dummy, which used to be only 10%-significant, now looks
even weaker). The model was further refined in column (3), where all variables that were not
statistically significant were sequentially removed (and the regression’s R-square remained
unchanged). This “reduced” model will be used as a basis for the simulations reported in § 5
of this paper.
4.2  Robustness checks
Starting from the complete model based on BBB- spreads (column 2), several
robustness checks were carried out.
                                                          
37 To save room, the individual values of the quarter dummies were not reported in Table 7. However, an F-
statistic for their joint significance is reported in the bottom part of the Table.
38 Spreads were computed as the difference between the seasoned BBB (Baa) corporate bond yields
published by Moody’s and the 5-year Treasury constant-maturity rate released by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.23
Separate sub-periods - Separate regressions were run for bonds issued between 1991
and 1998 (3,524 observations) and bonds issued between 1999 and 2003 (3,708
observations)
39, to test for any temporal evolution in the relevant factors. Results are
reported in columns (4a) and (4b). The adjusted R
2 increased from 0.81 in the first sub-
period to 0.86 in the second one, indicating that the independent variables improved their
explanatory power over the Nineties.
Several differences emerge, between the two sub-samples, as far as the control
variables are concerned: first, while FIXED and MANAGERS are not significant in the
second period, they both have a significantly negative coefficient in the 1991-1998 sub-
sample. Second, while MATU is not significant in the second period, it has a positive sign in
the first one. Finally, the effect of AMOUNT switches from negative to (slightly) positive
when moving forward in time; this might be explained through a supply-side effect (as the
market grew tighter in the early 2000s, larger issues became harder to place and had to pay a
relatively higher spread).
Note that, however, all rating dummies are statistically significant and the
spread/rating statistical relationship, which is the focus of our analysis, remains strictly
monotonic for the two sub-samples.
Banks vs. corporates - The second check regards the relevance of the issuer type
(“BANK”) dummy. This simple dummy variable may not adequately reflect the gap between
financial institutions and other firms if investors evaluate these two types of issuers
differently. Therefore, two additional checks were performed: first, the dummy coefficients
associated with the various rating buckets were estimated separately for banks and non-
banks, to see whether a different steepness of the spread/rating relationship (rather than a
difference in the average level) is found; second, separate regressions were run for
eurobonds issued by banks and for those issued by non-financial firms. Results are reported
in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7.
                                                          
39 Separating recession years from expansion ones is difficult because issuers from different countries have
different economic cycles. A simpler separation criterion, based on the number of issues, has therefore been
adopted.24
As concerns column 5 (same model, different rating-bucket dummies), only some of
the bank dummies are significantly different from their non-bank counterparts
40; what is
more, the difference between bank and non-bank spreads does not behave monotonically as
rating buckets worsen: while banks seem to enjoy lower funding costs, compared to non-
banks, on issues below BB, they appear to face comparatively higher spreads on bonds rated
BBB or BB.
As concerns column 6 (different models), all rating dummies are statistically
significant, explain a high portion of the spread and have monotonically increasing
coefficients for both sub-samples
41.
These results suggest that no clear, monotonic difference emerges between the
rating/spread relationship of banks and non-bank firms. A common scale of risk-weights per
rating bucket should therefore be adopted for both banks and non-financial firms, while a
separate treatment could be reasonable only for unrated exposures (as in the 1988 Accord).
Moody’s vs. S&P’s - Separate regressions using Moody’s’ ratings only (3,714
observations) and S&P’s ratings only (6,218 observations) were estimated, to check for
biases due to use of “average” ratings (using the average value of ratings coming from two
different sources could produce misleading results if the agencies adopt significantly
different criteria). Results are reported in columns (7) of Table 7: rating dummies are
                                                          
40 Pairwise t-tests between bank and non-bank dummies for the same bucket have shown that the null
hypothesis that the two be identical cannot be rejected without an error margin (p-value) of 48.3% for bucket 2,
0.3% for bucket 3, 0% for buckets 4 and 5; moreover, the hypothesis that the two intercepts for banks and non-
banks (which represent the case of borrowers belonging to bucket 1) are identical cannot be rejected without a
76.6% error.
41 Some differences exist between the two sub-samples when looking at the control variables. While
AMOUNT and FEES appear statistically significant for the non-bank subsample, they seemingly have no
impact on bank spreads; the opposite is true for PRIVATE and MATU. Finally, SUBO is strongly significant,
with a positive coefficient, only for banks. As mentioned before, rating agencies tend to downgrade
subordinated issues by one notch: seemingly, investors view this practice as fair (given the expected recovery
rates) only for corporate bonds: as concerns banks, subscribers are relatively more pessimistic than rating
agencies. This result can be explained in two alternative ways. First, investors find it more difficult to evaluate
the expected recovery rate in the case of bank-issued subordinated bonds because of a lower degree of
disclosure and of the financial nature of most banks’ assets: the higher degree of uncertainty gets then
translated into a higher required risk premium. Second, given the interest rate sensitivity of most banks’ assets,
it is more likely for banks than for non-financial firms that the same systematic factors determining insolvency
also cause a decrease in the recovery rate. In such a case, the banks’ default probability would be negatively
correlated with the recovery, leading to an increase in expected losses. This adverse phenomenon would
obviously be particularly exacerbated for subordinated bonds.25
statistically significant (with the expected sign) for both sub-samples and (as shown by the
adjusted R
2 and by the “F-rating” test), in both cases explain a significant portion of the
spreads’ cross-sectional variability. Besides, the spread/rating statistical relationship is very
similar for the two scales. The main difference between the two subsamples concerns SUBO,
which is significant for Moody’s only
42.
Issuer versus issue ratings - In an attempt to keep our sample as wide as possible, we
based our analysis on issue ratings (which are more easily found for our data source);
however, issuer ratings also play an important role within the Basel II standard approach.
Accordingly, for the available data (which are less than 50% of the original sample) our
basic model was estimated again using a set of buckets based on issuer rating. The results
(not reported to save space) show that the spread-rating relationship remains strong and
monotonic; the SUBO dummy becomes statistically significant, and has a positive
coefficient; this represents an expected finding because facilities’ characteristics, such as
subordination, are not embedded into issuer ratings.
National models A robustness check of the model in column (2) has been performed
by running separate regressions for each G5 country. The results, not reported to save space,
showed that the spread/rating relationship is similar (and always statistically significant) for
bonds issued by corporations of different countries. In addition to that, most rating dummy
coefficients show a monotonic pattern, indicating that spreads increase when ratings worsen.
Industry dummies – The BANK dummy had to be dropped from the models in
columns (1) and (2) because of its lack of statistical significance. However, one might object
that it would turn out to be relevant when considered inside a whole set of industry dummies
(covering all non-bank sectors on a one-by-one basis, instead of melting them into one
undiversified pool). This was done by including into model (2) a set of 23 dummy variables,
dropping the constant term to avoid perfect collinearity. The results (not reported) were the
following: 1) 7 out of the 23 industry dummies turn out to be significant at the 5% level;
among these, 6 (Financial and holding companies, Government-controlled concerns,
Insurance, Telecommunications, Transportation and Energy/Utilities) individually represent
                                                          
42 Note that, to assess the effect of split ratings on our results, we also repeated our regression analysis after26
more than 1% of the sample; 2) a joint LM test for the whole set of dummies leads to a F-
statistic of  11.8, with a p-value close to zero; 3) however, the coefficients and statistical
significance of the non-industry regressors remain approximately unchanged, as well as the
regression’s corrected R-square (79.6%); 4) moreover, the coefficient associated with the
banking sector’s dummy (7.07) continues not to be statistically different from zero at the 5%
significance level.
We conclude that although some industries (such as insurance and telecoms) show a
difference in the spread requested by the market (all other variables being equal), this is not
the case for banks; therefore, the investors’ assessment of a bank’s riskiness seems to be
fully captured by their comparatively better ratings, even when a whole set of industry
dummies is considered
43.
Granularity of the rating scale –Throughout our estimates, we used only five dummy
variables to summarize the rating spectrum shown by Table 2; this helped us make our
results more robust and more consistent with the Basel Accord, where individual rating
classes are grouped into larger “buckets”. However, one might wonder whether our estimates
would be affected by an increase in the “granularity” of the rating scale used: we therefore
substituted our set of “compact” rating bucket-dummies with 21 rating dummies, describing
all individual grades reported in Table 2.
The results of model (2) did not show any significant change
44: most control variables
remained virtually unchanged, in terms of coefficients and statistical significance. The
coefficients associated with the more “granular” rating dummies were also statistically
significant and generally increasing: however, a decrease in the value of the dummy variable
took place for the 18
th, 19
th and 20
th grade (corresponding to CCC, CCC- and CC) where our
sample tends to be scarcely populated (about 5 observations for each grade); this – together
with the fact that the R-square increases only marginally, from 79% to 81.4% - seems to
indicate that our choice of working with a compact set of rating buckets was correct.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
removing all split ratings (937 observations). The results (not reported) looked basically unchanged.
43 Including industry dummies into model (1) leads to similar results.
44 To save room, the results are not reported in the paper, although they are available from the authors upon
request.27
Spread/rating relationship under tight market conditions – Market conditions are
accounted for in our model in a very simple way, by means the BBB_SP variable which
represents the spread between BBB bond yields on the secondary market and those on 5-year
Treasury bonds; the effect of such a variable is assumed to be the same for all rating buckets.
However, one would expect that tight market conditions exert different effects on different
rating classes, implying that the spread/rating relationship becomes steeper when market
conditions are more strained. To check this, for each rating bucket we defined a new dummy
variable which takes a value of one if BBB_SP is above its long-term average of 2.6%. In
this enhanced model (not reported to save room), such dummies are statistically significant,
but their coefficients are not monotonically increasing when moving towards worse rating
buckets; we therefore preferred to stick to our basic model.
5. Implications for the adequacy of the Basel Committee’s proposed risk weights
5.1  Simulated spreads
Once the credit spreads required by the eurobond market have been decomposed into
their main drivers, we can use our reduced model (Table 7, column 2) to simulate the
spreads paid by a “standard” eurobond. This “simulated” bond has the following
characteristics:
-  it is issued by a group of ten managers (including co-managers, book-runners etc.)
for a gross fee of 100 basis points (these values are close to the sample averages
shown in Table 3), is denominated in US dollars
45 and pays a 6% coupon rate;
-  it has a 8-year maturity, and is issued at a time when BBB-rated bonds pay a risk-
premium of 2.6% over T-bonds (again, this mimics our sample averages; note,
however that sensitivity analyses will be performed on this second array of
parameters);
-  like most issues in our sample, it is publicly issued and unregistered.
                                                          
45 As the coefficients of the two currency dummies (Table 7) suggest, euro-denominated bonds would lead
to very similar results.28
Table 8 shows the simulated spreads required on different “rating buckets”. The
standard eurobond described above is compared to some alternative cases, considering:
-  shorter (5 years) and longer (10 years) maturities;
-  a change in the currency in which the bond is denominated (euro vs. US dollar);
-  different scenarios for the spread paid by BBB-rated bonds (ranging from 1.8% to
3.4%
46).
-  As can bee seen, spreads tend to remain mostly unchanged regardless of the working
hypotheses used in our simulations. While maturity and currency exert a limited
effect, changes in BBB-spreads induce a parallel shift in all values.
5.2  Capital requirements
In modern credit-risk literature
47, the optimal level of capital associated with the
marginal acquisition of a loan or bond is a function of the maximum potential loss (at a
given confidence level) that the investor could suffer over some specified time horizon
(typically, one year).
Several approaches have been proposed, in the last years, to quantify such an optimal
capital cushion, often referred to as “credit-VaR” (Value at Risk); one might recall, e.g.,
Gupton et al. (1997), Credit Suisse Financial Products (1997), Wilson (1997a, b)
48. The
correlation
49 among obligors operating in different geographic areas or industries plays a key
role in such models, and has been estimated based on the common dependence on a number
of “macroeconomic factors”, or simply inferred from past history (Carey, 1998; Altman-
Saunders, 2001) through a simulation/resampling approach. A simple credit-VaR model was
also used by the Basel Committee to calibrate the risk weights in the “IRB-based approach
                                                          
46 This ranges amounts approximately to twice the variable’s standard deviation.
47 See e.g. Allen and Saunders (2002), Crouhy et al. (2000).
48 See Gordy (2000), Allen and Saunders (2002) for a comparative analysis of such models.
49 This could be default correlation (as in binomial, default-mode models like Credit Suisse Financial
Products, 1997), as well as asset return correlation (leading to a joint distribution of credit rating migrations) as
in Gupton et al., 1997.29
50”; however, since the Accord aims at generating a portfolio-invariant capital requirement,
the correlation structure implied by such a model is quite simple and general
51.
Based on credit VaR models financial institutions set the share (say, k) of their
investments that has to be funded with equity capital. This choice also has implications for
pricing: indeed, the spread required on a risky loan/bond can be seen as a function of the
amount of capital associated to it
52.
More specifically, the spread si on a loan/bond to the i-th borrower is set in such a way
that the expected proceedings from the loan (allowing for its expected losses) cover all
expected financial costs (including the cost of the portion k that has to be funded with
capital, thereby incurring an extra cost of sk).
For a one-year loan, this amounts to imposing that
(1)  k s r k r p R p s r k f f i i i f ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 1 + + + − + = ⋅ + − + +
where: rf is the risk-free rate, p1i is the probability that the i-th borrower will default within
one year, R is the recovery rate on defaulted exposures
53, k is the loan’s implied capital ratio,
sk is the risk-premium the lender/investor has to pay on its shareholders’ capital. Equation
(1) simply states that the spread charged to a borrower depends on the risk-free interest rate
(a proxy for the bank’s cost of funds), the borrower’s probability of default, the loan’s
expected recovery rate, the amount of economic capital allocated to the loan, and the excess
return sk required by the bank’s shareholders on economic capital.
Note that, however, investors also incur screening and monitoring costs on risky
exposures; such costs must be added to the financial costs (rf) indicated in the right-hand
side of (1). Let then C  be the total cost (rf + c, where c is the unit screening/monitoring
cost). Equation (1) becomes:
                                                          
50 Gordy (2003), Finger (2001).
51 Pairwise correlations between borrowers depend on their size and credit rating, not on industries or
geographic areas.
52 See Ong (1999) and Saunders (1999).
53 This is the nominal amount the bank will be able to recover for each dollar originally lent. We impose
that the recovery takes place at the end of the year, so we need not multiply R by a capitalization factor.30
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Equations (1) and (2) postulate a risk-averse investor, requiring that the expected
return on the risky investment (left-hand side) is not simply equal to rf+c, but also includes a
premium over the risk-free rate. Generally speaking, such a risk premium can be seen as a
function of the amount of risk faced by the investor and the “fair” price of risk. More
specifically, if such an investor is a bank, then the risk-premium can be thought of as the
product between the amount of capital that must be held to offset risks (k) and the profit
margin (sk) on that capital deemed fair by the bank’s shareholders
54. In equations (1)-(2)
(and in the next ones), we are assuming that no extra-profits (above this “fair” margin) are
earned; in this sense, the market is thought to be pricing risk efficiently.
For two-year loans, equation (2) above becomes
(3) []
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where p2i is the (cumulated) probability that the i-th borrower will default within two years
55.
The more general case of a n-year loan requires that
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where pj,i is the (cumulated) probability that the i-th borrower will default within j years.
Equations (1)-(4) can be reformulated to calculate the level of k that is consistent with
the average spreads required by financial intermediaries on different rating classes. Namely,
(4) can be re-expressed as:
                                                          
54 Note that, although investors in the Eurobond market are not limited to banks, the latter play a major role
in the process of price-making (since most of the members of the issuing syndicate are commercial and
investment banks, as shown, e.g., by Levich, 2001, p. 352). Indeed, as banks do underwrite most of the issues,
they take most of the risk in the primary market, and set the price accordingly.
55 To keep things simple, we are implicitly using a flat risk-free yield curve. The model could be easily
generalized to non-flat rate structures. However, since our focus is not on risk-free rates, but rather on credit
spreads, we feel that this extra complexity would not be compensated by any significant improvement in the
accuracy of our conclusions.31
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to estimate k when the spread si is known. This will be used to estimate the capital ratios
implied by “typical” market spreads like those isolated in our regression analysis.
Such a methodology can be seen as complementary to other approaches that were used
in previous studies to assess the correctness of the risk-weights proposed by the Basel
Committee; in those studies, the historical pattern of defaults and default correlations
experienced by some credit markets (e.g. the US bond market in Altman and Saunders,
2001) were used to estimate the level and variability of loss rates associated with different
rating classes.
In our approach, past default rates are replaced by credit spreads, through which the
“reverse engineering” performed by equation (5) infers the capital levels that were regarded
as adequate by market participants
56 given the risk characteristics of different bond classes.
Moreover, default correlations (although not explicitly measured in our model) are indirectly
accounted for, since credit spreads also incorporate correlation risks as perceived by market
participants
57. In this sense, our approach uses an “average” correlation, valid for all
investors accepting a given spread; this looks consistent with the Basel objective of defining
a set of risk weights that do not depend on the specific portfolio composition of individual
investors
58.
                                                          
56 Note that this “optimal” capital might be influenced also by some “external” factors, that go beyond the
risk content of the underlying assets. For example, a financial institution might want to hold a capital level in
excess of credit VaR because of pressures from rating agencies, customer-relationship and market-share
concerns, or regulatory constraints (in this sense, the “optimal capital” that we will use to assess the adequacy
of Basel II might somewhat be affected by the “old” capital requirements valid under Basel I). However, non
risk-based factors should affect all rating classes in the same way, thereby not distorting their relative capital-
intensiveness.
57 Elton et al. (2001) have shown that credit spreads do not reward only individual default risks, but also, for
a significant share, a “systematic risk” component that investors cannot fully diversify.
58 Basel capital ratios are “portfolio invariant”, meaning that they are conceived in such a way that an asset
will always require the same capital level, regardless of the degree of portfolio diversification achieved by
different banks holding it.32
To estimate equation (5), we must specify values for its parameters. We proceed as
follows:
-  spreads si will be taken from Table 8;
-  n (maturity) will be consistent with the value (8 years) used to simulate spreads
(alternative values of 5 and 10 years will also be tested);
-  the matrix P = [pj,i] of default probabilities (for different time horizons and rating
buckets) will be based on the historical default rates recorded by Standard and
Poor’s
59 (see Table 9); note that using data by Moody’s (taken, e.g., from
Hamilton, 2002) would not affect our findings
60;
-  rf (risk-free rate) will be set at 5%
61, c (screening/monitoring costs) at 25.2 basis
points
62, while R and sk will be set according to the results of some recent research
works. Therefore, R will vary between 45% and 55%
63 (see e.g. Altman and
Kishore, 1996, Fons, 1994, Carty and Lieberman, 1996, Hamilton, 2002, Van de
Castle and Keisman, 1999, Hu and Perraudin, 2002), while sk will take a value of
4% (based on the results reported for a set of 12 large, industrialized countries, by
Maccario et al., 2002)
 64. As regards the latter, however, to incorporate the fact
that investors operating in the junk-bond market are perceived as riskier by their
own shareholders, institutions underwriting non-investment grade bonds will have
to pay a higher risk premium: sk will gradually rise to 8%.
                                                          
59 Our last rating bucket is based on the default rates for the CCC+/Caa1 rating class because no data is
available from S&P’s for other rating classes in the bucket.
60 Table 9 reports default probability by rating class. Those were transformed into average PDs per rating
bucket using the distribution of credit exposures reported in Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003), Table 2; for some
grades where the latter distribution was less granular than the one in Table 9, simple averages were used.
61 Sensitivity analyses were performed, using values of 3% and 7%. The effects on our final risk weights
were overall negligible.
62 This represents the mean management fee for the 7,232 issues in our sample. Although one might expect
management costs to increase as ratings worsen, no evidence of such a correlation was found in our data. A
“flat” value of c was therefore used.
63 This is a relatively prudent assumption. Recovery rates are generally lower in the bond market than for
corporate loans.
64 A sensitivity check was performed, considering an alternative value of 6%. No remarkable change took
place in the risk weights reported in Table 10.33
Before turning to the results, one must recall that the standardized capital levels
proposed by the Basel Committee are supposed to cover both expected and unexpected
losses arising from credit risks; on the other hand, the capital levels chosen by the investors,
and inferred from credit spreads in (6), only cover unexpected losses, so they do not account
for the whole capital buffer that banks are supposed to hold under Basel’s standardized
approach.
The outcomes generated by (6) are then adjusted accordingly, adding a measure of
expected losses given by the product between the n-year average PD and the expected
severity rate
65.
The results are reported in panel (a) of Table 10. Several findings appear noteworthy:
-  The capital levels implied by the eurobond spreads look higher than 8%, even for
some high quality bonds; this could follow from the fact that primary financial
institutions (like those underwriting bonds on the Euromarket) tend to hold capital
in excess of the minimum regulatory levels.
-  Low quality investments tend to be financed with a high volume of capital. At first
sight, the fact that in some cases the capital levels exceed the loss given default
may look counterintuitive; however, one should remember that recovery rates only
represent expectations of a stochastic variable
66. The volatility of actual recoveries
actually is one of the risk sources that capital is meant to cover.
-  The capital levels decrease - and the risk-weight curve becomes less steep - for
shorter-term investments. On the other hand, when market conditions get tighter
(as indicated by a higher spread on BBB bonds) capital levels tend to increase as
expected
67.
                                                          
65 The n-year expected PD for a borrower of class i is based on the cumulative default probabilities (pni)
taken from S&P transition matrices, and was computed as  n
ni p
1
) 1 ( 1 − − .
66 See e.g. Gupton et al. (2000), Van de Castle-Keisman (2000), Acharya et al. (2003).
67 Furthermore, as recovery rates increase, capital levels become higher; this seemingly surprising result can
be explained as follows. When we adopt a higher value of R in (6), a given spread can only be justified by a
higher capital consumption. In other words, when investors require a given spread (like those estimated in
Table 8 for different buckets) notwithstanding a higher recovery rate, this suggests that they are setting aside34
In panel (b), raw capital ratios are converted into standardized risk weights. This is was
made in two steps: first, capital ratios were multiplied by 12.5 to obtain the corresponding
risk weights; second, they were multiplied by a constant scaling factor, chosen in such a way
to ensure that, when applied to the distribution of banks’ credit portfolios by rating buckets
reported on panel (c) (as estimated by the Basel Committee
68), they lead to a weighted
average risk weight in line with the current 100% level. This is consistent with the objective
of the New Capital Accord, as explicitly stated by the Basel Committee, not to alter the
overall capital levels of the banking industry.
The resulting curves are steeper than those proposed by the Committee (panel “d”);
this means that the degree of risk-sensitivity of the new requirements, although it marks an
undoubted improvement over the “uniform” 100% risk weight currently assigned to all
corporate loans, still lags behind the indications coming from market data.
In other words, the new risk weights, although they differentiate among loans and
bonds of different credit standing, still seem to imply a relevant degree of “cross
subsidization” among exposures, with investment-grade borrowers paying for a share of the
risks originated by speculative-grade exposures.
5.3  Confidence intervals
As noted above, the risk-weighing curves reported on Table 10 look steeper than the
one adopted by the Basel Committee. However, they are based on the point estimates of the
coefficients reported in Table 7. One therefore must check whether this greater steepness
survives, once the volatility in coefficient estimates is accounted for.
To do so, we “shocked” the estimates of the rating dummies’ coefficients reported in
Table 7 (column 3), by adding and subtracting twice their standard errors. For example, the
                                                                                                                                                                                  
more capital against unexpected losses. Although a higher R reduces expected losses, the net effect remains
positive.
68 See Catarineu-Rabell et al. (2003), Table 2. In their study, the estimated distribution of banks’ portfolios
is based on the results of a quantitative impact study (simulating the effect that the new Basel Accord proposals
would have for a sample of banks), published by the Basel Committee in November 2001. The study includes
weighted average information on the quality distributions of corporate, interbank and sovereign portfolios held
by those banks. The results have been weighted inside countries by the capital of the banks and between
countries by the relative importance of the international banking sector.35
coefficient associated with bucket 1 (i.e. the constant term: -181.58) was both increased and
decreased by twice 9.65, getting two values of -162.28 and -200.88 respectively. The same
was done for the other rating buckets
69.
Those two sets of “shocked” values were then used to generate two alternative sets of
risk weights (“upper” and “lower”), as shown in Figure 1. Here, the “central” values
represent the “base case” weights of Table 10, while the grey steps on the background show
the values adopted by the Basel Committee. The Figure shows that:
-  the risk-weights associated to adjacent buckets remain different from each other
even when one considers confidence intervals instead of point estimates;
-  in the case of the best two rating buckets, our “confidence brackets” overlap with
the values (20 and 50, respectively) indicated by the Basel Committee, suggesting
that the difference between our estimates and the regulatory weights may not be
statistically significant;
-  however, this is not true for the last three buckets, where our confidence brackets
do not cross the grey areas representing Basel’s choices;
-  as concerns the 100% regulatory weight, there is evidence that it overstates the
riskiness of BBB-rated exposures, while seriously understating the risk of BB-
rated issues, for which a 150 risk weight might be more appropriate;
-  risk looks seriously understated also in the case of exposures below BB: although
our coefficient estimates look comparatively more volatile than for low-risk
grades, they indicate that a risk weight of at least 250% would be more consistent
with market spreads.
6. Conclusions
The Standardised Approach of the New Basel Capital Accord was designed as a
deliberately simplified framework, to increase its applicability to a wide array of financial
                                                          
69 For each bucket from 2 to 5, both the constant term and the rating bucket’s coefficient were used;
accordingly, the standard errors used to shock the central estimate were computed based on the
(heteroskedasticity-adjusted) variances and covariance of  the constant term and the rating bucket’s coefficient.36
institutions. Its simplicity, though making it less risk-sensitive than the internal ratings-based
approaches, is by no means a shortcoming: actually, it represents a huge advantage, ensuring
that this approach can be implemented effectively in a broad range of circumstances.
While embracing this simplified framework, this study has examined the ability of the
Basel Committee’s risk-weights to adequately reflect the risk-rating relationship. Issuance
spreads on 7,232 eurobonds issued during 1991-2003 have been used in order to estimate the
average spread per rating bucket and evaluate the risk-rating relationship. Three main results
emerged from the empirical analysis. First, the spread/rating relation is strongly significant,
with spreads increasing when ratings worsen. Second, the estimated spreads per rating class
indicate that the risk/rating relationship might be steeper than the one approved by the Basel
Committee. Finally the difference between the spread/rating relation of banks and non-
financial firms appears quite blurred and statistically questionable. This indicates that the
distinction between banks and non-financial firms proposed in the Accord should be further
investigated.
70.
Following these empirical findings, three main possible enhancements should be
considered in the future to the standardised approach risk-weights. First, the distinction
between rated banks and non-financial companies might be made less compelling; a more
favorable weight for banks would certainly be justified only for unrated entities. Second, the
risk-weights per rating bucket might be adjusted in order to reflect a steeper relationship
between risk and rating. Third, five rating buckets could be considered rather than the four
                                                          
70 One might argue that, for a given rating class, banks tend to show higher default frequencies than non-
financial corporations, at least in the U.S. This was shown by Ammer e Packer (2000), by means of a probit
model based on Moody’s data, in which rating and vintage effects are separately accounted for: their results
(see Table 4 in the paper) quantify in 2.14% the expected default frequency for banks, as opposed to 1.37% for
non-financial corporations. This result was recalled by the Basel Committee itself, in its 2000 survey on rating
sources (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000); however, Cantor and Falkenstein (2001), working
on data for speculative-grade issuers, have shown that the gap between banks’ and non-banks’ historical default
rates appears significant only if one assumes that default probabilities stay constant over time. When a more
sophisticated framework is adopted (where default probabilities fluctuate over time because of short-term
shocks, like the Savings & Loans crisis), no clear proof emerges that banks are to be considered more risky
than non-financial firms in the same rating class. However, none of the above-mentioned studies ever hinted
that banks should be considered less risky, as in the Committee’s standardised approach.37
currently proposed by the Basel Committee
71. Namely, the third bucket including rating
classes from BBB+ to BB- (from Baa1 to Ba3 in the Moody’s’ scale) could be split into two
different levels.
Such revisions would make the standardised approach even closer to the markets’
sentiment, thereby bridging a potentially dangerous gap between the first and the third
“pillar” of the new regulatory architecture.
                                                          
71 Note that the real steepness of the rating-risk relationship might be somewhat understated, as risky issuers
may be more likely to issue in good times. As concerns our sample, however, the relative incidence of junk
issues seems to be influenced only marginally by the “tightness” of the market: although the correlation
coefficient between the incidence of speculative issues on the total and the BBB_SP variable is slightly
negative (-13%), it is not statistically different from zero; besides, the relative importance of junk issues
remains unchanged at 7% both before January 2001 (when BBB_SP averages 219 b.p.) and afterwards (as the
average BBB spread jumps to an average of 373 b.p.).Tables
Table 1













AAA to AA- / Aaa to Aa3 20 20 10
A+ to A- / A1 to A3 100 50 30
BBB+ to BBB- / Baa1 to Baa3 100 100 30
BB+ to BB- / Ba1 to Ba3 100 100 100
B+ to B- / B1 to B3 100 150 100
Below B-/B3 150 150 150
Source: Altman and Saunders (2001), Basel (2001).
Table 2
RATING SCALES
# 123456789 1 0
Moody’s Aaa Aa1 Aa2 Aa3 A1 A2 A3 Baa1 Baa2 Baa3
S& P’s AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB+ BBB BBB-
Our bucket 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
# 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 9 2 0 2
Moody’s Ba1 Ba2 Ba3 B1 B2 B3 Caa1 Caa2 Caa3 - -
S&P’s BB+ BB BB- B+ B B- CCC+ CCC CCC- CC D
Our bucket 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5Table 3
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (CONTINUOUS VARIABLES)
 Spread Rating Amount Maturity Coupon Managers Fees
N 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232 7,232
Mean 88.5 4.5 432.0 97.7 6.0 10.2 1.0
Median 52.6 4.0 256.1 72.0 6.1 8.0 0.7
Max. 1014.0 21.0 7000.0 1200.0 15.0 54.0 6.5
Min. -23.50 1.00 0.10 12.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 115.9 3.7 564.8 75.0 2.4 8.9 0.8
Notes: SPREAD: “nearest-on-the-run” spread, i.e., difference between the yield to maturity
at issuance of each individual Eurobond and the yield to maturity of the Treasury bond
denominated in the same currency and with the nearest maturity. – MATURITY: the time to
maturity (in years) of the issue. – AMOUNT: the U.S. dollar-equivalent amount of the issue
(US$ m). – RATING: the equivalent value (see Table 2) of the average Moody’s and
Standard and Poor’s issue rating. – COUPON: the annual coupon (percent). – MANAGERS:
the number of financial institutions participating in the issuing syndicate. – FEES: the total
gross fees (%) earmed by the eurobond issuing syndicate (underwriting fees, management
fees and selling fee).
Table 4
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (DUMMY VARIABLES)
Subo Reg Cross Pledge Force Private Fixed Bank
N. of issues for which data is available 7232 7232 4584 5106 4428 7232 7232 7232
N. of issues for which dummy = 1 419 1662 2864 3478 4388 120 5120 3698
% of Total available data 5.79% 22.98% 62.48% 68.12% 99.10% 1.66% 70.80% 51.13%
Notes: SUBO equals 1 if the issue is subordinated and zero if it is senior. – REG equals 1 if
the bond is registered and zero if it is in bearer form. – CROSS equals 1 if the bond issue
includes a cross-default clause and zero otherwise. – PLEDGE equals 1 if the bond issue
includes a negative pledge clause and zero otherwise. – FORCE equals 1 if the bond issue
includes a force majeure clause and zero otherwise. – PRIVATE equals 1 if the bond issue is
a private placement one and zero if it is a public issue. – FIXED equals 1 if the bond issue is
fixed priced and zero if it is open priced. – BANK equals 1 if the bond issuer is a bank, zero
otherwise.Table 5
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS -





























Canada 286 4.0% 125 43.7% 97.5 5.5 85,835 2.7% 300.1 8.9
France 797 11.0% 378 47.4% 50.6 3.2 309,359 9.9% 388.2 9.1
Germany 1,031 14.3% 871 84.5% 45.6 2.2 473,918 15.2% 459.7 6.9
Japan 717 9.9% 178 24.8% 38.5 6.4 197,219 6.3% 275.1 7.3
Netherlands 572 7.9% 452 79.0% 55.7 2.8 202,371 6.5% 353.8 7.0
United Kingdom 912 12.6% 299 32.8% 104.6 5.1 346,879 11.1% 380.3 11.0
United States 1,412 19.5% 678 48.0% 100.4 4.4 1,065,020 34.1% 754.3 7.8
Other (57 countries) 1,505 20.8% 717 47.6% 151.6 6.3 443,823 14.2% 294.9 7.8
Total 7,232 100.0% 3,698 51.1% 88.5 4.5 3,124,423 100.0% 432.0 8.1
Table 6
SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS –
































AAA/Aaa 2292 31.7% 1670 72.86% 35.0 29.5 1,128,208 36.1% 492.2 7.3
AA+/Aa1 512 7.1% 366 71.48% 39.1 34.8 151,848 4.9% 296.6 6.9
AA/Aa2 680 9.4% 384 56.47% 46.8 32.8 227,619 7.3% 334.7 7.3
AA-/Aa3 762 10.5% 376 49.34% 53.0 44.5 314,685 10.1% 413.0 9.1
A+/A1 556 7.7% 233 41.91% 85.0 48.6 280,767 9.0% 505.0 9.6
A/A2 565 7.8% 268 47.43% 100.4 49.5 328,034 10.5% 580.6 9.0
A-/A3 402 5.6% 106 26.37% 110.4 66.4 199,085 6.4% 495.2 9.4
BBB+/Baa1 420 5.8% 100 23.81% 122.0 79.6 208,700 6.7% 496.9 9.7
BBB/Baa2 311 4.3% 56 18.01% 117.8 78.3 113,832 3.6% 366.0 9.0
BBB-/Baa3 189 2.6% 18 9.52% 158.7 119.1 61,575 2.0% 325.8 9.0
BB+/Ba1 84 1.2% 5 5.95% 193.3 142.7 17,436 0.6% 207.6 8.3
BB/Ba2 115 1.6% 16 13.91% 235.2 165.8 21,093 0.7% 183.4 6.6
BB-/Ba3 74 1.0% 19 25.68% 346.7 191.6 12,132 0.4% 163.9 6.1
B+/B1 121 1.7% 53 43.80% 438.1 152.5 23,380 0.7% 193.2 5.8
B/B2 67 0.9% 15 22.39% 538.3 177.3 15,741 0.5% 234.9 7.9
B-/B3 51 0.7% 12 23.53% 591.9 186.9 11,852 0.4% 232.4 8.5
CCC+/Caa1 6 0.1% 0 0.00% 594.4 147.1 2,130 0.1% 354.9 9.2
CCC/Caa2 7 0.1% 1 14.29% 563.4 132.1 977 0.0% 139.5 9.1
CCC-/Caa3 3 0.0% 0 0.00% 409.8 41.9 950 0.0% 316.7 8.3
CC/- 4 0.1% 0 0.00% 105.3 24.7 600 0.0% 150.0 14.3
D/- 11 0.2% 0 0.00% 362.9 219.4 3,779 0.1% 343.6 11.2
Total 7232 100.0% 3698 51.13% 88.5 115.9 3,124,423 100.0% 432.0 8.1Table 7








































Constant -253.54*** -178.91*** -181.58*** -72.45*** -257.65*** -173.28*** -173.85*** -82.07*** -272.1*** -138.34*** -185.08***
(17.51) (10.34) (9.65) (9.68) (10.68) (7.39) (7.57) (7.76) (13.53) (9.68) (8.25)
ISSBUC02 21.67*** 29.47*** 29.72*** 24.94*** 20.71*** 27.92*** 30.34*** 28.78*** 25.12*** 34.43*** 28.75***
(1.38) (1.40) (1.37) (2.37) (2.05) (2.62) (2.31) (2.11) (2.67) (2.38) (1.86)
ISSBUC03 56.73*** 67.15*** 66.57*** 49.20*** 56.19*** 78.56*** 64.15*** 80.22*** 54.74*** 76.37*** 65.51***
(2.38) (2.30) (2.23) (3.53) (2.50) (4.41) (2.53) (3.73) (2.96) (3.72) (2.32)
ISSBUC04 154.04*** 172.46*** 172.14*** 227.23*** 122.15*** 222.65*** 163.90*** 268.22*** 138.03*** 228.61*** 160.38***
(6.85) (7.08) (7.02) (5.16) (4.53) (8.73) (4.12) (6.93) (4.92) (6.91) (4.00)








(10.67) (10.03) (10.01) (4.89) (6.44) (6.54) (4.99) (5.43) (6.35) (5.49) (5.00)
SUBO 4.84* 3.05 4.86 1.94 3.50 15.49*** -0.98 10.54*** 0.86
(2.54) (3.10) (3.62) (3.56) (2.98) (2.83) (6.95) (4.02) (3.22)
MATU 0.04** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.17*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
BANK 0.71 1.74 -1.88 3.52* -0.01 2.77*
(1.32) (1.48) (1.92) (1.85) (2.08) (1.63)
AMOUNT -0.69 3.09*** 3.57*** -5.33*** 1.48 2.67*** 0.63 6.14*** 1.06 2.45**
(0.95) (1.04) (0.93) (1.42) (1.13) (0.99) (1.07) (1.59) (1.29) (1.05)
COUPON 29.41*** 19.88*** 19.88*** 11.28*** 38.16*** 19.69 9.59*** 29.90*** 14.40*** 22.15***
(1.66) (0.93) (0.93) (0.56) (0.81) (0.50) (0.53) (0.82) (0.62) (0.55)
REG 20.43*** 27.43*** 26.82*** 23.58*** 24.37*** 26.64*** 13.19*** 34.97*** 22.12*** 26.46***
(2.65) (2.98) (2.94) (3.03) (2.85) (2.32) (2.66) (3.62) (3.39) (2.47)
MANAGERS 0.11 -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.54*** -0.12 -0.84*** -0.52*** -1.31*** -0.65*** -0.94***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19) (0.10) (0.09) (0.21) (0.12) (0.12)
FEES 8.15*** 5.84*** 5.68*** 5.80*** 10.30*** 5.29*** -0.67 10.11*** 4.66*** 4.00***
(1.28) (1.43) (1.42) (1.25) (1.53) (1.10) (1.17) (1.82) (1.35) (1.18)
PRIVATE -4.68 -4.85 6.92 7.57 -5.05 -20.00* -4.34 -7.66 -7.92
(6.25) (7.72) (5.20) (8.16) (5.08) (11.42) (6.09) (7.89) (5.23)














(1.53) (1.73) (2.15) (1.88) (1.62) (1.86) (2.47) (2.14) (1.72)
BBB_SP - 28.50*** 28.32*** 21.68*** 26.71*** 28.21*** 20.35*** 35.95*** 25.03*** 29.45***
- (1.22) (1.21) (1.66) (1.19) (0.96) (1.06) (1.50) (1.30) (1.02)
(Table continued on next page)CAN 43.28*** 25.28*** 25.15*** 24.80*** 36.15*** 25.72*** 16.93*** 30.54*** 19.62*** 29.09***
(3.89) (3.46) (3.45) (3.69) (6.81) (3.64) (3.28) (8.98) (4.42) (4.18)
DEM 12.15*** 2.85 2.92 11.34*** -5.95 3.13 -0.18 -8.98 -3.35 3.92
(3.50) (3.40) (3.40) (3.92) (8.03) (4.08) (3.56) (10.29) (4.90) (4.57)
DFL 52.62*** 14.57*** 14.17*** 17.80*** 14.91*** 0.07 35.11*** 4.95 18.91***
(4.78) (4.02) (3.98) (4.76) (5.07) (4.34) (13.47) (6.17) (6.00)
EUR 59.25*** 25.29*** 25.22*** 26.68*** 81.94* 25.40*** 7.84** 44.09*** 13.32** 30.78***
(5.10) (4.23) (4.22) (4.21) (46.60) (4.41) (3.92) (10.79) (5.40) (5.14)
FFR 37.02*** 42.77*** 42.88*** 33.61*** 43.75*** 42.62*** 13.98*** 63.89*** 28.45*** 46.70***
(4.81) (4.37) (4.32) (6.46) (6.76) (3.98) (3.69) (9.26) (4.84) (4.48)
STG 34.67*** -0.53 -1.27 11.05*** -0.37 -9.93** 5.35 -13.48*** 2.94
(4.37) (3.76) (3.72) (4.20) (4.24) (3.95) (9.69) (5.13) (4.83)
USD 30.12*** 23.73*** 23.59*** 13.41*** 44.03*** 23.81*** 7.46** 35.55*** 13.40*** 28.60***
(4.07) (4.03) (4.05) (4.33) (7.16) (4.09) (3.80) (9.52) (4.90) (4.66)









(10.06) (7.26) (7.24) (11.55) (8.71) (5.80) (5.88) (11.61) (8.85) (6.43)
CAN -20.68*** -23.79*** -24.21*** -14.80*** -17.66*** -22.98*** 7.97* -47.10*** -0.92 -29.74***
(3.92) (4.86) (4.87) (3.88) (5.62) (3.67) (4.30) (5.45) (4.91) (3.86)
FRA -18.24*** -22.33*** -22.73*** -13.72*** -22.50*** -21.70*** -2.96 -33.04*** -7.39** -23.62***
(2.11) (2.32) (2.31) (3.18) (3.39) (2.68) (2.93) (4.26) (3.43) (2.88)
GER -13.81*** -10.15*** -9.89*** -7.78*** -14.26*** -9.49*** -1.50 -3.86 2.85 -14.43***
(2.12) (2.39) (2.34) (2.78) (2.98) (2.38) (2.26) (5.34) (2.81) (2.63)
JAP -33.16*** -44.66*** -44.94*** -12.78*** -53.73*** -44.38*** -20.60*** -51.23*** -11.63** -50.18***
(3.33) (3.80) (3.79) (4.73) (4.95) (3.88) (4.61) (5.94) (5.64) (4.18)
NL -17.23*** -10.85*** -10.68*** -6.53* -19.76*** -10.32*** 1.49 -24.50*** -0.17 -13.27***
(2.22) (2.40) (2.35) (3.56) (3.44) (2.87) (2.71) (6.21) (3.32) (3.06)
UK -11.67*** -14.02*** -14.07*** -0.08 -15.56*** -13.73*** 4.66 -30.89*** -4.63 -18.70***
(2.30) (2.65) (2.66) (3.08) (3.10) (2.52) (3.00) (3.79) (3.19) (2.69)








(2.08) (2.44) (2.42) (2.75) (2.67) (2.17) (2.46) (3.35) (2.88) (2.31)
N 7232 7232 7232 3524 3708 7232 3698 3534 3714 6218
R-squared 0.839 0.790 0.790 0.808 0.864 0.793 0.778 0.813 0.797 0.793
Adj. R-squared 0.837 0.790 0.790 0.806 0.863 0.792 0.776 0.811 0.796 0.792
F-statistic 464.24*** 905.57*** 1044.19*** 488.9*** 834.4*** 808.5*** 443.4*** 524.4*** 483.7*** 789.7***
F-rating 1285.12*** 1598.80*** 1615.36*** 1112.5*** 529.6*** 691.2*** 1285.5*** 1293.7*** 542.4*** 1062.6*** 1300.1***
F-quarter 63.83***
Note: Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) – F-rating   (-quarter, -country) denotes the F-statistic for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all rating







































ESTIMATED SPREADS PER RATING BUCKET
AAA to AA-
/ Aaa to Aa3
A+- to A-
/ A1 to A3
BBB+ to BBB-
/ Baa1 to Baa3
BB+ to BB-
/ Ba1 to Ba3
Below BB-
/Ba3
Base case 52.3 82.0 118.9 224.5 381.0
5-year maturity 49.4 79.1 116.0 221.5 378.1
10-year maturity 54.3 84.0 120.8 226.4 383.0
Euro-denominated 54.0 83.7 120.5 226.1 382.7
BBB-spread at 1.8% 29.9 59.6 96.5 202.0 358.6
BBB-spread at 3.4% 75.2 104.9 141.8 247.3 403.9
Table 9
AVERAGE CUMULATIVE DEFAULT RATES BY RATING GRADE
(BASED ON STATIC POOLS, 1981-99)
Y e a r 12345678 9 1 0
AAA 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.06% 0.10% 0.18% 0.26% 0.40% 0.45% 0.51%
AA+ 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.21% 0.33% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47% 0.47%
AA 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.09% 0.16% 0.30% 0.42% 0.50% 0.60%
AA- 0.03% 0.09% 0.23% 0.35% 0.49% 0.69% 0.86% 0.99% 1.07% 1.16%
A+ 0.02% 0.07% 0.15% 0.33% 0.46% 0.61% 0.79% 0.93% 1.15% 1.40%
A 0.05% 0.11% 0.17% 0.22% 0.37% 0.51% 0.62% 0.79% 0.99% 1.17%
A- 0.05% 0.17% 0.30% 0.48% 0.73% 0.96% 1.28% 1.53% 1.73% 1.89%
BBB+ 0.12% 0.29% 0.56% 0.87% 1.18% 1.64% 1.98% 2.20% 2.29% 2.38%
BBB 0.22% 0.52% 0.74% 1.12% 1.50% 1.76% 2.00% 2.27% 2.56% 2.89%
BBB- 0.35% 0.71% 1.12% 2.09% 3.02% 3.93% 4.81% 5.53% 6.05% 6.53%
BB+ 0.44% 1.21% 2.75% 4.08% 5.22% 6.51% 7.48% 7.89% 8.66% 9.51%
BB 0.94% 2.59% 4.62% 6.04% 7.34% 8.72% 9.57% 10.72% 11.45% 11.80%
BB- 1.33% 4.28% 7.42% 10.47% 13.00% 15.65% 17.18% 18.58% 19.77% 20.70%
B+ 2.91% 7.74% 12.08% 15.44% 17.92% 19.66% 21.38% 22.80% 23.79% 24.75%
B 8.38% 16.01% 21.00% 23.73% 25.73% 27.59% 28.79% 29.79% 30.84% 31.85%
B- 10.32% 18.27% 23.32% 27.02% 29.40% 31.03% 32.79% 33.74% 34.51% 34.78%
CCC 21.94% 29.25% 34.37% 38.24% 42.13% 43.62% 44.40% 44.82% 45.74% 46.53%
Source: Standard & Poor’s (2001).
Note: this table represents the transposed of matrix P in the paper)Table 10
ESTIMATED CAPITAL RATIOS AND
PROPOSED RISK WEIGHTS PER RATING BUCKET
AAA to AA-
/ Aaa to Aa3






/ Ba1 to Ba3
Below BB-
/Ba3
(a) Simulated capital ratios (%) (recovery rate of 45%, unless otherwise specified)
Base case 7% 14% 27% 49% 92%
5-year maturity 5% 13% 22% 34% 69%
10-year maturity 7% 15% 30% 56% 96%
Euro-denominated 7% 14% 27% 49% 93%
BBB-spread at 1.8% 2% 9% 22% 47% 91%
BBB-spread at 3.4% 12% 19% 32% 52% 94%
Recovery of 45%: 6% 13% 25% 42% 75%
Recovery of 55%: 7% 14% 28% 54% 100%
(b) Our risk-weights (% - 100% means that risk-weighted assets equal unweighted assets)
Base case  21  44  85  157  294
5-year maturity  22  53  91  143  288
10-year maturity  21  43  85  161  277
Euro-denominated  22  45  85  156  292
BBB-spread at 1.8%  6  33  80  170  334
BBB-spread at 3.4%  33  54  89  146  263
Recovery of 45%:  23  49  89  152  271
Recovery of 55%:  20  42  84  159  300
(c) Portfolio structure by rating grade used to compute our risk-weights
9.2% 26.8% 30.0% 28.6% 5.4%
(d) Basel Committee risk weights
20% 50% 100% 100% 150%Figure 1
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